In Brief
- Higher rates are testing private credit, with flexible loans and mixed default definitions making headline figures less straightforward.
- Most stress events lead to negotiation, making recovery rates and flexibility in outcomes key for investors.
- Private credit may be facing its first real credit cycle, likely resulting in greater dispersion in fund performance rather than a failure of the asset class.
Rising financing costs are fueling investor concerns about private credit. Once favored for its income-generating potential when rates were low, this asset class is now under intense scrutiny as rates climb. Rising rates can have a more pronounced effect on private credit because many loans in this sector are structured with floating rates. As benchmark rates increase, borrowers face higher interest expenses, which may strain their cash flows and add to the risk of default. This means that both lenders and borrowers must continually adjust to changing market conditions.
Stress within private credit has mostly been idiosyncratic, concentrated in specific sectors. Even today, it is the direct lending segment of the private credit market that is attracting the most attention, but this is still less than half of the overall private credit market.
Performance remains robust with strong returns in recent periods. However, headlines about elevated default rates challenge this narrative, raising questions about whether private credit is now facing its first genuine credit cycle.
Understanding the nuances of defaults and the unique nature of private credit markets is essential for investors navigating this space.
The multiverse of “default” rates
Private credit markets feature a range of definitions for "default", which vary among index providers and lead to dispersion in reported figures. Traditionally, a loan default means failing to meet repayment obligations and is a hard rule in public bond markets. Private lending, by contrast, offers more flexibility for both borrowers and lenders.
Private credit’s broader definition of default often captures market distress rather than just missed payments. These measures include lender-agreed changes to loan terms and liability management exercises designed to create flexibility, which can help avoid outright default. Distressed exchanges, non-accruals, payment-in-kind (PIK), maturity extensions, covenant breaches or amendments are all commonly captured in default rates while not being actual defaults.1
Index providers adopt different combinations of distress signals in their definition of “default”. So, while certain indices may show elevated levels of ‘default’, more narrowly defined conventional default rates may be more comparable and have remained well below 2% in recent months (Exhibit 1).
PIKing through the details
PIK is a common metric used to capture market stress and is often captured within default rates. However, even here, the treatment of PIK can vary widely. PIK amendments occur when lenders agree to capitalize periodic cash payments into the loan’s end value. The use of PIK has increased in recent years (click to GTA P69), with implied default being used as an indicator of market stress. However, there’s a distinction between loans with PIK options embedded from the outset and those where it was added later.
"Amended PIK" refers to PIK features that were added to a loan after origination, often as a response to financial distress. When a borrower negotiates to switch from cash interest payments to PIK, it typically signals that they are struggling to meet their obligations. In contrast, loans with PIK options embedded from the outset are usually structured that way for flexibility, not because the borrower is in financial strife.
Most of the rise in PIK comes from loans originated with this feature (or toggle in private credit jargon), reflecting a financing choice rather than distress. Conversely, the current share of "amended PIK" remains marginally less than a third of all PIK loans, suggesting more limited deterioration in loans.
The recovery edge
A default in private credit is often the start of a negotiation, not the end of a loan. Realized losses are crucial for investment portfolios, with recovery rates determining how much debt defaulted versus the losses ultimately borne by investors.
Default rates for private credit, high yield and leveraged loans are similar, at 2.0%, 1.9% and 1.2%, respectively. Despite slightly higher default rates, private credit has a higher recovery rate (41.7% versus 37.9% and 39.0% for high yield and leveraged loans respectively).2 Recovery rates are often higher than in public markets because borrowers can negotiate directly with lenders.
Similarly, although unrealized losses on private credit may appear worrying at first glance, tracking at 1.6% on a trailing four-quarter basis by 2Q26 relative to 2025’s 0.4%3, aggregate fundamentals remain supportive. For example, leverage ratios among private borrowers have fallen below pre-pandemic levels in recent years (4Q19: 6.2x, 2Q26: 5.6x), while interest coverage has strengthened (Exhibit 2). This may help cushion borrowers against rising financing costs.
The maturity wall is a ramp, not a cliff
The private credit maturity wall has become a focal point for the market. The concern is that heavy refinancing will be needed, potentially at much higher rates than when the loans were originated. Borrowers typically begin refinancing well before maturity, leading to a ramp-up rather than a sudden cliff.
The main risk is refinancing, not defaults, given higher rates and pockets of stress. ‘SaaSocalypse’ fears have fueled markdowns in software-related loans and at USD 202billion, software accounts for approximately a fifth of business development company lending. USD 50billion of this matures in 2028 or earlier, with 30% rated at CCC+ or below4, which could amplify refinancing risks for this segment.
However, the software sector has staged a remarkable recovery across both public and private markets since the SaaSocalypse fears emerged earlier this year. Software continued to have the lowest default rate among other sectors5, with 74% and 68% of software companies still expanding revenue and earnings on a year-over-year basis6. This suggests that the ultimate impact could remain manageable
Investment implications
Elevated “default” rates on broad measures may weigh on perceptions of private credit health, but conventional default rates suggest a more constructive outlook. Higher benchmark rates support income on floating-rate loans, while simultaneously increasing debt-service burdens for borrowers. The longer rates remain elevated, the more important underlying credit quality becomes.
Risks are becoming more differentiated as private credit may be facing its first real credit cycle. However, as with investing in many asset classes, discipline can bring opportunity. A disciplined approach to direct lending, asset-based finance and more complex financing solutions is a way to generate portfolio income. Senior secured exposure to larger borrowers offers better protection than junior debt, while asset-based finance adds return drivers less tied to corporate leverage and software.
This is a market for active, selective allocation, with wider spreads improving the entry point for new capital.
