In stark contrast to the decade pre-pandemic, the defining feature of the current economic cycle is a desire to spend. Governments are spending to increase the resilience of their economies, and companies are spending to take advantage of new technologies. We expect these spending forces to continue in 2027 and therefore remain constructive on the outlook for global growth.
It isn’t all smooth sailing, of course. While 2025 brought tariffs and trade tensions, 2026 brought a war in the Middle East and rising energy costs. The continuous flow of unpredictable and economically damaging geopolitical news is causing governments everywhere to spend on projects to improve resilience, ranging from defence and domestic energy, to technology and the onshoring of critical manufacturing.
In Europe, Germany’s fiscal push is set to be the key contributor to spending, as the European Union’s Recovery Fund broadly draws to a close at the end of 2026 with only modest residual spending continuing into 2027. Even as the annual growth rate in spending eases somewhat, the investment backdrop is a far cry from the austerity of the prior decade (see Exhibit 1).
AI infrastructure investment
At the same time, the tentacles of tech spending are reaching further and wider through the global economy. The US remains the epicentre of the impulse, but the benefits are increasingly being felt in Asia and across Europe (see Exhibits 2 and 3). Despite ongoing concerns about the return on investment and rapidly increasing input costs, the tech builders show little sign of slowing down their spending. On the whole, capital expenditure (capex) plans are still being revised up, with just five US ‘hyperscaler’ companies planning on spending more than USD 1 trillion in both 2027 and 2028.
Consumer spending has remained relatively robust despite the energy shock. In the US, households have continued to spend through the latest inflation uptick, drawing on savings and borrowing to sustain consumption. The significant gains in US stock prices in recent years, given US households’ exposure to equity markets, likely also encouraged such spending.
European consumers have also shown resilience, in part thanks to targeted government support helping to limit the hit to real household incomes. Europeans have, however, been reluctant to tap into the substantial savings accumulated in recent years. Consumer spending continues to be a key reason behind the weakness in European activity relative to the US. The outlook for energy prices therefore becomes critical for unlocking this vast war chest of savings – EUR 3 trillion by our calculations – that households across the European Union have amassed since the pandemic (see Exhibits 4 and 5).
Energy and external shocks
The drag of higher inflation will persist as we move into the start of 2027, with inflation rates across Europe set to rise further. Refined products, particularly diesel, are a key source of this price pressure.
While the Middle East has proved adept at getting crude oil out to the world, safety risks have hampered exports of refined products. Additionally, the sharp fall in Russian exports following Ukrainian attacks on refineries has further restricted supply. Together, these disruptions have removed 30% of the seaborne diesel exports that dictate global prices. Increased US production has helped, but refinery utilisation above 90% leaves little additional spare capacity.
China, as the world’s largest global refiner, represents 18% of global capacity. Most of its refined products are consumed domestically and its share of tradeable exports is much lower. It recently relaxed its March 2026 export controls and exports increased to 0.5mbd of diesel in September. If this was sustained then it would help bring diesel markets back towards balance, though China’s willingness to do so at this stage is unclear.
Higher diesel prices will then likely filter into food prices, so certain components of inflation may remain sticky. But we don’t see inflation prompting the need for much higher interest rates in 2027. Even without a complete political resolution in the Middle East, base effects should help headline inflation rates to start falling by the end of the first quarter. And most importantly, there is currently very little evidence that cost-of-living pressures are spreading to what would become the core of an inflation problem – wage growth.
When elevated headline inflation results in workers asking for more money, we get into the vicious cycle experienced in 2022. Costs rise for firms, so firms raise prices. But then their wage bill goes up, so firms raise prices again, and so on.
This time around wage growth remains surprisingly subdued. The reason may be that the current spending spree hasn’t really shown up in job creation, leaving the jobs market, even in the US, in a ‘no-hire, no-fire’ state.
It’s not obvious that AI is the reason. Most of the weakness we have seen in the US jobs market in recent years is in sectors that are relatively unaffected by AI, such as agriculture, mining and construction.
So long as wages remain under control – and this is a key watch item for us – central banks will not feel under huge pressure to act to stop the spending spree. We expect that policymakers will be keen to demonstrate their vigilance as headline inflation proceeds over the hump that we expect in the first quarter. However, we would characterise any action as minimal warning shots, and see the risk of a more material tightening cycle as relatively low.
Global growth outlook
Our central expectation is that global growth will remain robust in 2027, and that the signs that growth is broadening, by sector and by region, will become increasingly apparent as energy prices fade.
The risk that has us slightly more on edge as we head into 2027 is governments trying to ask the bond market for too much in a world in which the hyperscalers are also issuing debt. Politicians battling for positions in the upcoming elections in Europe will find themselves facing the difficult choice of whether to please their electorate, or their bond market.
The French election takes place across April and May and, until that time, the bond market is likely to need to continue encouraging politicians to be honest about the difficult choices that will need to be made about the welfare system, and in particular, the generous retirement policies that look increasingly unaffordable (see Exhibit 6).
Italy will also be in focus, with the next general election due before the end of 2027 and a possible victory for the centre-left raising the risk of a shift in fiscal priorities. In Germany, the coalition’s future rests on its ability to resolve internal disputes after electoral setbacks.
An early election in the UK is not our base case, but the government will face some tough fiscal choices having kicked the can down the road on major spending decisions in October’s budget. At the 2027 Spending Review the government will have to be clear about how it plans to fund defence and get the welfare bill under control to avoid the endless cycle of yet more taxation.
Fiscal risks and bond market constraints
While these events may create market volatility, we firmly believe that none of these events will be the start of a new sovereign crisis in Europe. Many European economies made the adjustments that they needed to make during the sovereign debt crisis, with primary deficits across the previously weaker peripheral countries having turned to a surplus over the last decade (see Exhibit 7).
Given this situation, the European Central Bank will be willing to use its toolkit to shield other countries while the conversation between the bond market, politicians and the French electorate reaches a conclusion.
We do not believe political noise will be disruptive enough to overwhelm the constructive growth backdrop. Indeed, we would go as far as to say politically driven weakness may provide a good opportunity to engage with European assets.
Frequently asked questions
The article's central expectation is that global growth remains robust in 2027, driven by two multi-year spending forces, with signs of broadening growth by sector and region as energy prices fade. Growth is supported by government spending to increase economic resilience and corporate spending on new technologies, which together are overwhelming the drag from higher energy prices.
Factors that could support global growth:
- Government investment, led by Germany's fiscal push.
- AI infrastructure investment, with the five major US "hyperscaler" companies planning further large spending in 2027 and 2028.
- Resilient consumer spending in the US and Europe, helped by an expectation of lower energy prices.
- Only modest further increases in interest rates given a still-subdued backdrop for wage growth.
- Headline inflation falling (after a Q1 hump) thanks to more favourable base effects.
Factors that could weaken global growth:
- Sticky prices of refined oil products such as diesel, driven by a lack of refining capacity.
- A pickup in wage growth that evolves into much stickier inflation (a "key watch item").
- Aggressive central bank tightening if inflation pressures build.
- Political headlines — French presidential election, Italy's general election before end-2027 with a possible centre-left win shifting fiscal priorities, German coalition disputes, and the UK facing difficult fiscal choices having avoided major changes at this October's Budget.
- Bond markets acting as a "speed bump" by denying viable funding to some borrowers.
Investors should monitor bond markets closely, given increased scrutiny on governments that are making unsustainable choices on spending.
- In France, rising government bond yields could act as a warning sign to politicians that tough choices need to be made to rein in the level of spending.
- Italy will also be in focus, with a potential change in government at the 2027 elections which could lead to a change in fiscal priorities.
- The UK’s fiscal choices will be important to watch following October's Budget, where the government largely avoided major spending decisions. Early election risks could also keep the bond market on edge.
The scenarios most likely to move markets involve politics, energy, and the interplay between central banks and inflation; important indicators to track include wages, inflation, energy prices, and bond yields.
Scenarios that matter:
- Resolution (or a further deterioration) in the Middle East and Ukraine conflicts.
- Germany's coalition status after electoral setbacks.
- A potential early UK election.
- French or Italian election outcomes and the implications for fiscal sustainability.
- The trajectory of wage growth.
Market indicators that matter:
- Wage growth — explicitly flagged as a "key watch item".
- Headline inflation trajectory, especially the expected Q1 2027 hump and subsequent base-effect-driven fall.
- Refined-product prices (particularly diesel).
- Bond market pricing and sovereign spreads, which will shape the debate between politicians and the electorate.
- Central bank actions, which the article expects to be "minimal warning shots" rather than a more aggressive tightening cycle.
- Revisions to hyperscaler capex plans.
The article attributes continued strength in tech and hyperscaler capex to companies pressing ahead with spending on new technologies despite rising costs. The US remains the epicentre of the tech spending impulse, with benefits increasingly felt in Asia and across Europe. Hyperscaler capex plans have been revised up substantially, and five US "hyperscaler" companies (Amazon, Microsoft, Google/Alphabet, Meta and Oracle) have very large spending plans for both 2027 and 2028. Despite ongoing concerns about the return on investment and rapidly increasing input costs, the tech builders show little sign of slowing down.
Fiscal spending is positioned as the primary engine of economic resilience in 2027. Governments are spending explicitly to increase the resilience of their economies, with outlays spanning defence, domestic energy, onshoring of critical manufacturing, and technology. The article argues these flows, together with corporate tech capex, have overwhelmed the drag from higher energy prices and are responsible for considerable resilience in global activity. Consumer resilience has also been supported in Europe by targeted government support that limited the real hit to household incomes.
However, fiscal spending also introduces constraints on resilience:
- Most governments that want to spend do not have the cash flow to do so and must turn to bond investors for funding.
- Government leverage/debt has risen more than any other sector in recent years, meaning stress may be felt most acutely by sovereigns.
The bond market will control both the speed and nature of spending in 2027 by providing viable funding to some and not to others.
France illustrates the risk: political leaders must convince the electorate that generous welfare and retirement policies are neither affordable nor feasible — though the article frames this as a French problem, not a European one, with the ECB willing to use its toolkit to shield other countries.
Germany's fiscal push remains the key European contributor, while the EU Recovery Fund broadly closes at end-2026 with only modest residual spending in 2027.
