Man: Welcome to the Center for Investment Excellence, a production of JPMorgan Asset Management. The Center for Investment Excellence is an audio podcast that provides educational insights across asset classes and investment themes.

Ryan McNamara: Welcome everyone and thank you for taking the time to join the call today. My name is Ryan McNamara and I’m a consultant advisor for JPMorgan Asset Management.

Today I’m excited to be joined by my colleague Ben Mandel. Ben is an economist in our Multi-Asset Solutions Group where he is responsible for formulating global tech asset allocation (unintelligible) based on thorough analysis of the global economy.

Ben has recently co-authored a paper on the (Intech) as a global work from home labor force (unintelligible) COVID-19 prompting lasting behavioral changes and share some thoughts on investment implications of the increased work from home labor force.

We will touch on some of the key takeaways from this piece and explore on what exactly the implications are for institutional investors. Ben, thanks for joining us today.

Ben Mandel: Thank you very much for having me.

Ryan McNamara: To kick things off, Ben, let’s get the state of the union on COVID-19 and the economy. How did COVID-19 in resounding wake of market volatility it has generated alter the way you think about and evaluate the economy?

Ben Mandel: Thanks, Ryan. Let me just start by saying that I think it’s difficult to overstate the degree of ramifications from the COVID shock and I think that stands for the macro environment for sure as we think about the economy and markets, how we’re positioned in our multi-asset portfolios.

I think it’s also important to acknowledge the micro aspect of this from a professional front in terms of how we interact with our jobs at an individual level and that’s really the focus of the paper and how that adds up to something more macro even personally just by way of quick anecdotes to my great aunt always used to say that marriage is for better or for worse but not for lunch.

And so I thought of that a couple of times over the course of these months at home all of us together. And of course don’t worry about me and my marriage. Everything is fine. But it has really such a cord in terms of how this has really changed the way we operate on a variety of levels.

So to your question, let me start by talking about what we learned and perhaps some more near-term implications of COVID before going into the longer-term aspect of working from home and such.

First I think we’ve learned a little bit about the nature of the shock when it first hit in, let’s say, mid-March to late March. There was an ongoing debate about what is the state of this shock. So how do you describe it? Is it a classical recession for our growth traders and then gradually repairs although that propagation takes some time or is it more of a natural disaster where you get an extremely sharp decline in activity but then a very brisk period of payback as things start up again?

I think the information we’ve gathered over the last few months have increasingly put weight on that latter story. It looks more like a natural disaster in terms of the rebound in May and June both in US economy but pretty much ubiquitously everywhere that had taken place.

And so we’ve been thinking about this as a very fast-moving shock and one where we expect the new few months to be ones where growth globally is above trend although perhaps decelerating from the really, really explosive growth that we saw in May and June.

That brings me to my second point which is that we’ve begun a new business cycle here. But that cycle is not going to be a normal one given the pace at which we’ve been moving through this shock.

So as we kind of score where we are in the cycle, are we early, mid, late or recession, it was very clear that we are in recession in March and April.

However the speed of the rebound implies that we’re moving very briskly through the early phases of the cycle and it won’t be surprising if we are to extrapolate out from here to be sitting a year from now in an economy that landed firmly in mid cycle.

And so those large unemployment gaps and output gaps are looking like they’re going to close relatively quickly. And so some of the things we normally expect in the early phase of the cycle both in terms of the economy and markets might be sort of flashing the pan type of phenomenon.

The underpinning for that recovery is something we expect to be more persistent and steady as that policy has been extremely supportive and the rollout of the monetary policy tools of the Fed that’s out there is still underway and they continue to expand, expand and reach further into the guts of the economy in terms of credit provisions and those facilities that they put into place we expect to be a source of reassurance that we’re not going to go back to those March-April levels of activity if and when they’re activated.

Maybe the final caveat to this is that the economy is one and above trend growth we’re breathing through early cycle. Policy settings are somewhat supportive. The balance of risk as a result of that relatively positive story has swung a little bit more negative.

And so our baseline case is one where we’re fairly sanguine. The alternative case has been getting a little bit worse on a month-to-month level, you know, thinking about the second derivative of growth being less supportive as you hear for markets to do well when growth is positive and accelerating perhaps a little bit more vulnerable when it’s positive but decelerating.

We’re obviously at the whim of the virus here which we think about as a sequential issue. The left tail of that distribution is fairly well understood. We could be in a lower growth environment if the virus surges. The right tail of the distribution, which is the vaccine, just needs more distance in relative terms than that left tail.

And of course policy - I mentioned monetary policy, fiscal policy has been an important ingredient in this recovery and that’s another contributor to that negative second derivative story. It’s still going to be supportive but much less supportive than it was as we move through the summer and that’s something we’re two months from now for the final phase of fiscal relief that’s provided by the US government.

That’s why I think things got a little shakier because that moral support has been pulled out to some extent and that in turn creates some gap between US and growth elsewhere where we think policy support is a little bit more spent time.

So adding all those up we’ve been risk on in terms of posture in our portfolios. We’ve been spreading the risk fairly evenly between equities and credit as a way of getting some access to that upside risk in the global economy of things to prepare but also having the sharp ratio basis, some access to asset classes where if we’re in that lower growth but okay growth environment that they do okay and that’s the role of credit especially in areas where there’s an explicit or implicit backstop for monetary policy.

Equities in the rest of the world has been an area of focus for us. We’ve increased our allocations to some of the cyclical markets and Europe and emerging markets in particular. We’re not all the way there in the sense that we maintain an overweight to US large cap as a bit of a security blanket with the idea that that’s defensive. It’s our baseline thesis ended up being somewhat off.

And finally just thinking about what are the hedges in portfolio, I think the bad news for multi-asset investors is that duration at current levels is not really giving as much support as it has historically. Stock bond correlations are still negative but just looking at the day-to-day trading of the treasury is about 70 basis points you’re not getting a payoff from that insurance policy from holding duration and portfolios.

And so I think a key thing to think about if you’re taking that risk on provision of how do you hedge the downside in an environment where you’re getting a little bit less bang for your buck from duration. So currency might be one aspect of it, mitigating the size of those over weights and risk assets might be another. But of course that’s very idiosyncratic depending on the portfolio.

Ryan McNamara: Good. Thanks for that, Ben.

Flipping over to the paper. Now the paper covers a number of topics in ways that the increasing situation of work from home for the workers is impacting economic measures as well as what kind of investment implications may be generated from this nomenclature which is kind of outcome of the virus.

I think I’d ask you to trim all your topics in what could be your favorite one here but what are the key takeaways you see thematically from work from home and what do you think is the most important investment implications and topics that can come up in the future?

Ben Mandel: Thanks. I do love all my children easily. But I think from this piece of research there are few things that jump out.

So let me just explain very basically what we did. It’s an empirical exploration of a capacity of the global labor force to work from home which is of the same ilk as some of our long-term capital market assumptions thematically which is geared towards low-frequency (unintelligible) that we expect to play out over the next decade or so.

And the one that is really most closely related to is tech adoption. Tech adoption is a lynchpin in the assumptions in the sense that at the end of the day you get out of markets what the economy is giving you.

And so our long-term capital market assumption projections for bonds and stocks and everything that’s of spread to the risk-free rate is predicated upon what is the long-term economic outlook and the thematic for what we do is geared towards telling us something about productivity, something about labor force growth, something about inflation, the inputs to nominal growth which then filter through into the different asset classes.

And one of the toughest aspect of our job as macro forecasters in that framework is to think about this productivity is going to revert to more normal levels after a very disappointing period after the global financial crisis. There are a lot of things that drive productivity. Some of them are cyclical or some of them are structural.

But there was a prevailing narrative given the very persistent underperformance of productivity that there was almost a follow period for technological innovation and adoption and that’s a very negative implication in terms of secular productivity growth and margins and all of that in our forecast.

And so we said about trying to back up our assertion and the assumptions that’s relatively positive one which is that there is a wave of technological innovation and adoption underway. It is yet to show up in a productivity data but we are using that as an upside risk to our macro assumptions in the context of the projections.

So we did that in a few ways. One is we looked at e-commerce in the last edition of the assumptions which were released in October. And in that piece we’re talking about very different data sources to prove is that happening, right? Is e-commerce adoption really happening? And of course it was happening even prior to COVID at a very rapid rate. The 1% of retail sales 20 years ago now it’s 11% our own proprietary data suggest it might be 20% and that was prior to the shock which really accelerated it.

Working from home is the other visible aspect of that trend. And so again we said about to gather data on how many people can work from home and what are the underlying drivers of that trend. And so we constructed our own independent estimates of how many people are work from home globally and look at the geographic distribution of those workers.

I guess just to summarize the findings we found several big gaps. There are gaps between working from home capacity and how many people actually do it. The Bureau of Labor statistics published a really interesting survey result three years ago where they’re talking about 25% of people do work from home. About 30% are able.

But that actually was an overstatement in the sense that only 15% of people spend a whole day for a week working from home and only 9% at least one day a week. So it’s actually not a very common thing even though some people have said it before.

Our estimates of how many people are working from home today given the stark choice that firms are facing to either work from home or lay people off is somewhere in the 40% to 45% range.

Our estimates based on the underlying driver, so they kind of take a more systematic approach across the different regions to say, “What are the drivers of working from home?” Internet penetration, service sector jobs which are more intensive in working from home. Higher education is a still biased technology after all and younger populations who are more prone to, although willing to, work from home as a generational preference when we add all those up.

We get estimates in the 37% range or 35% to 40% I’d say for all developed market economies. There’s not a ton of dispersion across the rich world.

And so one of the main themes here is that just for another very visible piece of evidence that the technological impulse that we looked at as an upside risk in our projections is actually happening. We see convergence in those gaps somewhere from that 9% to do it once a week towards the 40% just so where we think the limit is in terms of who can work from home.

And so thematically that’s a big data story, you know, accelerating ways of tech adoption as an upward impulse to growth, a downward impulse to inflation and that’s big news in the context of equilibrium interest rates which are closely related to nominal growth and also the firms where I would probably give the generally entire margin but also higher fair value of P/E.

And so the big thematic takeaway which is still for convergence over time after COVID is over and that may well happen.

The last thing I’ll say is in terms of big themes is of convergence between emerging market economies and developed market economies. You know, the level of working from home ability is much higher in the developed world than the emerging world and that’s coming from big gaps in higher Internet penetration, service sector orientation, higher education. Emerging markets are somewhat younger in terms of demographic but that’s not enough to offset all the other gaps that we’ve identified.

And so developed market economies on average are 37% work from home labor force in terms of capability. Emerging markets are only about 24%.

And so that’s the gap which tells you something about the potential for convergence over time in the future. You know, we tell stories in the (unintelligible) about EM convergence and productivity and this is a very concrete example of that and helps justify at least the potential for those big growth gaps in emerging markets to hold in the future and offer some support for some of those internationally-oriented themes that come out of our projections.

Ryan McNamara: Ben, you mentioned labor productivity and inflation a little bit in that last answer. Can you talk about the work from home culture and the impact it could potentially have on either wage growth or adjustments and how that may shift inflation expectation?

Ben Mandel: Yes. I mean, I guess we’ll all find out in due course what the effect on wages is going to be. But I think in all seriousness it could be relatively large as an effect in the near term and is playing into what has been a somewhat sleepy aspect of the forward-looking projections which is inflation.

So we’ve been in a period over the last five years or so where inflation has been relatively low compared to where central banks wanted to be. And you have an alignment of a lot of the factors that were driving inflation lower.

So, you know, technology is one thing that could cause inflation to be lower but you had a (flat) in the economy after the global financial crisis. There’s a debate about demographics pushing inflation lower. Globalization seems like an obvious candidate, you know, and China has got the WTO in 2001 that corresponded with a lot of offshoring and the downward pressure on US marginal cost.

Inflation expectations, you know, just the efficacy of central banks pushing inflation higher when they’re at zero or lower down is simply lower. And so inflation expectations of language near the low levels that are consistent with hitting the central bank charges.

I think that story is starting to change as we think about those different drivers and where they’re going. So, you know, obviously technology to the extent that we’re observing that in the real world now and the data is starting to push inflation lower (flat) after this crisis will play a part for some time in keeping inflation lower.

But the other drivers have either been neutralized or are starting to push upwards. Demographic drag is not what it used to be five or ten years ago as we roll those projections forward.

Globalization has stalled essentially and in some places actually reversed. And so that effect on inflation seems to have changed course.

Inflation expectation is an open question but you can make an argument that the relative coordination between monetary and fiscal policy, in other words the (WFP) of debt monetization, might be one of those things that pushes inflation expectations upwards.

And of course one thing that we’re starting to look at in a much more systematic way is climate change. So the policies that help mitigate (unintelligible) consequences eight years from now those policies tend to be relatively inflationary in the near term since the price of carbon goes up and pushes up the cost of an array of different goods and services in the economy.

So what that saying we’re sort of entering a period where you’ll want more heterogeneity in the drivers of inflation. The near term looks like those technology and (flat) forces will keep pushing lower. But the long term, so we think about the 10, 15-year forecast that we’re trying to produce the out years of that forecast is much more upside inflation risk than we’ve seen in recent years as those factors swing either to neutral or to the inflationary side of the ledger.

And so it’s one where I think there’s more uncertainty about inflation over the 10, 15-year period and quite possibly even more inflation or volatility which has its own channel into the financial markets.

Ryan McNamara: And thinking about all of this, are there certain sectors you see as winners and losers coming out of the pandemic and as work from home culture increases and as we hope they move closer and closer to treating and ultimately eradicating the virus?

Ben Mandel: Yes it’s a good point. I mean, so far we’ve been talking mostly about data stories, you know, the effect on overall growth and inflation and EM/DM convergence. But there are a lot of alpha stories as well that I would attach to this tech adoption in general and working from home in particular.

And I’d probably group them into two groups. One is tech exposure. So one of the sector level exposures to that theme and how do those add up into geographic exposures. In terms of sector weights tech is 25% of the S&P right now. So that’s 1% of Japan, 16% of emerging markets. And so those are relatively heavy tech exposures.

It does kind of move in the same direction as the EM converging story. So if you believe that EM is catching up and will be able to leverage the technological frontier on the macro side and had a lot of homegrown terms that you get exposure to through the EM Index I think that is kind of setting up a story of relative thematic exposure to EM.

I think there is a real question about S&P which is obviously an exposure to tech albeit one that, you know, one of the active debates on our team right now is how defensive is the US stock market given the narrow base of support from tech maintenance. And I think just in terms of day-to-day trading on updates, you know, tech as well relatively - down base tech as well relatively.

So there are definitely some shocks out there to which tech is relatively defensive. So thinking about the virus shock in particular I think it also needs to be balanced on the other side being vulnerable to other side, right? So regulatory changes the valuation being relatively high all that and we expect a little bit more prone to being sold off more aggressively in a more generalized risk off environment.

So I think we continue to debate the defensiveness of the S&P based on that tech exposure. But I think there are a bunch of stories. There are firm-level stories, sector-level stories and geographic exposure that’ll make this a bit of a rich environment from an alpha perspective if you’re able to pick those winners.

The other one I would like to mention is urban de-densification. The other thing that might create winners and losers in a somewhat more micro level is the fact that -- and this really hits home in New York City -- is how dense is optimal in an environment where, you know, you have these big negative externalities from something like a virus.

And there’s an open question as to how the density of a major urban conglomeration is going to change over time and what the spillover effects are the different stakeholders, who’s holding the bag for vacancy rates in the cities that go down and the prices that go down either at the bank, is it the landlord, is it the businesses themselves who have to relocate.

I think there’s an open question about the incidents of those losses, you know, and I think that’s probably a good question for a specialist in real estate and private markets, what is the reallocation that’s going to take place between real estate where urban commercial is the obvious loser here and not totally obvious on the residential side where that de-densification is a bit of a wash between relatively dense urban areas and less dense suburban areas. And so a lot of questions about density and what that means for markets as well.

Ryan McNamara: One of the other questions that I have been getting from my clients and other colleagues there they’ve been talking about with their institutional clients is just really the incredible run that growth has had relative to value over the last several years.

And there’s a little bit talks towards the end of last year that there needs to be mean reversion at some point. We think that there are some opportunities and value. Clearly that has not played out at all this year. And you mentioned the technology sector a number of times in your comments.

Could you speak to growth versus value, what is it and your thoughts on relative out and underperformance (unintelligible)?

Ben Mandel: Yes. I mean, if you have to choose I’ll say growth has a few things going for it there. Obviously the sector or winner story from tech is one thing and I think this is kind of big under the surface of the style description. A lot of that growth outperformance is tech. And so let’s give it a more direct attribution.

I guess the other perspective of that is where you think rates are going and not only that but how fast is the cycle progressing. And so based on it at the beginning about monetary policy we expect rates to be (unintelligible) for a very long time here.

And so even as the economy recovers, the central bank’s forward guidance is going to gear much more towards inflation. And so it’s going to be less sensitive to those growth outcomes than it has been historically.

So part of it is just rates are going to be lower and that’s been correlated with relative performance of value. Where the value had performed well historically has been the incipient spaces of business cycles when growth really takes root and broad invest and it’s that period precisely that’s being squeezed here as we race through the early stages of the cycle.

And so you want exposure to the secular winners. We expect rates to be (pinned) for some time and the cycle is just lightning speed right now.

And so any period of outperformance might actually be short if and when that does happen. And so that’s kind of the case I guess. If you want to make it for growth, I guess one countervailing point is that those aren’t the only stories at the regional level that we deal with.

And so speaking about Europe for example where, I mean, there’s only a 12% exposure of Europe stocks to tech in terms of sectoral composition. Europe and the US are pretty much the same in terms of working from home capacity. They’re at the frontier and growing relatively slowly compared to emerging markets.

All that said we still like Europe. We find the reasons and work by no means secular overweight Europe we’ve been underweight for years. But we’re looking at a constellation of more supportive policy kind of collectivization of fiscal which has been a big support and actually takes away that left tail risk and the risk premium associated with the euro area break up. That’s positive for an array of European assets that dissipates.

And, you know, in the near term probably fiscal support remains a little bit more robust and, you know, the euro probably appreciate it versus the dollar. So all that is kind of good news for Europe from an unhedged dollar based investor’s perspective even in the face of being relatively high exposure to value and more exposure to tech.

So, you know, it’s an important theme in terms of tech exposure I have to say. It’s on a dominant theme everywhere and always.

Ryan McNamara: One more for me, Ben. As you mentioned earlier in the call, we typically will publish our long-term capital market assumptions once a year in the fourth quarter. In the second quarter in April this year your team put out an update to our long-term capital market assumption for the first time midyear. Can you talk about the impetus for the adjustments and the changes that were made and why they felt it was necessary to make those adjustments?

Ben Mandel: Yes. I think that’s important to clarify. After 24 years of publishing on an annual frequency we did a midyear adjustment and the reason is that we felt like we needed to adjust for the current crisis of asset class which has swung so dramatically in the first quarter of the year.

Just as a refresher as we think about our long-term capital market assumptions those projections are a function of equilibrium and steady state objects. So, you know, what is the equilibrium bond yield is going to - going into or out of recession what are fair value P/Es, what are margins that we expect to persist over 10 to 15 years for firms. Those are steady state, very slow-moving concepts.

We have those. And then we have current pricing. And our assumption includes the path from current prices to those equilibrium levels. And so (unintelligible) to swing around as much as they did we decided to remark as of March 31. Of course in hindsight we did manage to pick almost the bottom of the equity market for that remark.

And so what the results were from that exercise is changing the starting point around was continuation of the steepening of the stock bond’s frontier. So the efficient frontier steepened out even more than it did over the course of 2019 because bond returns (unintelligible) and the term premium, which had gone away never to be heard from again, got even lower.

And so on the bond side of things returns got even lower from a forward-looking perspective and on the equity side some of those more recently valued markets had come down quite substantially.

And from a forward-looking perspective valuation is less than a drag and in some cases an increment to our forecast. And so the result’s implication was get back to these equities on a long-term strategic time horizon. I guess everyone should have listened to what we said pretty much immediately because then you got this massive rally in risk assets. And if you were to remark today that steepening wouldn’t be quite as pronounced as it was a few months ago.

Ryan McNamara: Talking about fiscal and monetary stimulus there’s been quite a dip introduced into the economy and into the system this year. How long lasting do you think this influence of that stimulus will be?

Ben Mandel: The fiscal stimulus is fairly short lived. I mean, no less important but short lived. And a lot of what we’ve seen in terms of the household side of the economy has been a function of that fiscal stimulus. And you can see that in the household saving rates here in the US which surged to 30% and that was a reflection of those transfer payments from the government’s enhanced unemployment insurance.

So even as you have this massive decline in real income from an ex-transfer perspective, those transfers were more than enough to fill the hole from an aggregate perspective.

And so extremely meaningful moves in the near term which we expect to wane over the course of the coming quarters. I think our expectation is that we’ll get another stimulus package over the next month or so which extends some of those enhanced unemployment benefits more to the tune of an extra $300 versus $600. So still supportive but less supported than it was before.

And, you know, I think this has raised a lot of really deep questions for us. A lot of speculation out there about how loose will fiscal policy remain in the future. In other words are we entering a new regime where monetary policy is very accommodative and fiscal policy remains aggressive or the very least does not fall back that extra growth that it punched into the system recently and that coordination of monetary and fiscal policy raises a lot of thorny questions. Who pays for that? When do they pay for it? Is it something that’s a generation away or within our 10, 15-year outlook? Is it that (WFP) of debt monetization that actually pushes inflation expectations back upwards? In a perverse way that will be a welcome development by central banks.

And so I think the near term effect is for fiscal policy to wear off pretty quickly. But I think we’ve opened up. You know, we certainly captured a lot of imaginations with the idea that fiscal, not just in the US but in Europe and elsewhere, is going to be much more aggressive and much more coordinated with monetary policy and that could have very big ramifications for things like inflation in the long term.

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